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Stalin's Face: On History and its Deconstruction in Howard 
Barker's The Power of the Dog 
Stephen Weeks 
The first scene of Howard Barker's The Power of the Dog (written in 1981 
and produced in 1984), titled "A Great Man Hallucinates," depicts a wartime 
conference between Churchill and Stalin. Presided over by a Scottish comedian 
named McGroot—a hilariously de-familiarizing presence—the scene is both parodic 
and disturbing. At one point, Stalin thinks he sees a waiter rubbing the image of 
his face with a pencil. "Why is he rubbing my face with a pencil? [...] why is he 
rubbing me out?" Stalin asks. Then he imagines a terrifying excision: 
It's scissors he's got! For cutting me out of the films . . . 
the man with the miniature paintbrush is turning my face into 
sky . . . a lifetime's work, painting Stalin out of every frame . . . 
one idle moment, dreaming of cunt in the archives, and I slip 
by—there, I saw him, behind Lenin, don't blink! It was Stalin!1 
The representation of his face and the haunting vision of its erasure preoccupy 
Stalin throughout the play. In Barker's final scene, a focal point of this essay, 
Stalin says: "It is very difficult to photograph Stalin as he is. Who is Stalin? One 
day he was in a film, and the next they rubbed him off (56). He recognizes his 
face as the signifier of his identity and historical destiny; his quest is to capture its 
authentic image, but the nightmare of being rubbed out, of having his face turned 
into sky, shadows that quest at every turn. 
Through this imagery of erasure/effacement, I wish to link certain 
deconstructive gestures associated with Jacques Derrida with the mechanisms of 
oppression associated with Stalinism. My broad intention is to read the play in 
post-structuralist terms and to situate it in relation to the ongoing debate over post-
structuralism and the question of the political. The Power of the Dog compellingly 
stages some of the characteristic concerns of post-structuralism and deconstruction; 
indeed, it is a play that clearly belongs to the post-structuralist moment of the early 
1980s. But it is also a play ahead of its time. It seems to anticipate Stalinism's 
final moment in the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 as well as developments 
in the debate over post-structuralism's access to, or relevance to, the political. To 
explore the anticipatory elements of Barker's play, I will consider the direction 
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The artist Alexander 
Rodchenko defaced his own 
copy of the album Ten Years 
of Uzbekistan, which he had 
designed. After 1937, Stalin 
purged many Uzbeck Party 
bosses, and Rodchenko 
responded by blotting out, 
cutting out, and blocking out 
their images. This one is of 
Akmal Ikramov, shot to death 
in 1938, after a show trial. 
From The Commissar 
Vanishes by David King. By 
the author's permission. 
Another image from 
Rodchenko's album, this time 
of a woman, D. Abidova. Her 
exact fate is unknown. 
From The Commissar 
Vanishes by David King. By 
the author's permission. 
The top photograph is 
from the Uzbeck edition 
of Ten Years of 
Uzbekistan, publish in 
1935, showing an array 
of Party figures. The 
bottom photograph is 
from the Russian 
edition, belonging to 
Alexander Rodchenko, 
publish in 1934. The 
Uzbeck edition deleted 
the figure on the bottom 
right, because of an 
early purge. Rodchenko 
blocked out additional 
images after the purges 
of 1937 
From The Commissar 
Vanishes by David 
King. By the author's 
permission. 
A detail from a photograph in the 
Soviet archives showing Mikhail 
Tomsky (standing), a member of 
Stalin's Politburo, and other 
comrades. Tomsky was denounced by 
Stalin and later shot himself. The 
photograph was defaced by persons 
unknown. From The Commissar 
Vanishes by David King. By the 
author's permission. 
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Derrida's work has taken in the 1990s. The atmosphere of restlessness—or perhaps 
exhaustion—that characterizes Western political thought since the end of the Cold 
War has produced new attempts to theorize the political, including Derrida's recent 
approach to the problems of law and justice. The perception of deconstruction as 
a practice confined to textual play, lacking either political or historical purchase, 
has begun to change, and it is changing in ways that make a Derridean reading of 
Barker seem apposite and timely, even necessary. Conversely, Barker's particular 
way of illuminating Stalin and the historicity of Stalinism allows us to read the 
latent political content of deconstruction more clearly.2 
Before continuing, let me briefly summarize key elements of the play. The 
action unfolds near the end of the Second World War, around 1944. There are two 
settings—the Kremlin and the battlefields of Poland—and three major groups of 
characters: Red Army soldiers at the Polish front, Stalin and his entourage at the 
Kremlin, and two Hungarian photographers, Victor and Ilona, who have been 
photographing war atrocities. The soldiers and the photographers continuously 
interact, but the only time a character from the front interacts with Stalin and the 
Kremlin group comes in the final scene when Ilona is singled out for the onerous 
task of taking Stalin's official portrait. 
Totalitarian Erasure 
Stalin's paranoid hallucination in the first scene derives from one of the most 
ominous mechanisms of historical Stalinism—the fabrication of history according 
to the dictates of ideology and the material results of the Terror. That history-
making should be driven by ideology is hardly noteworthy, but new to the world 
was the scale of the effort, and the efficiency with which historical representations 
of all sorts were made and remade. David King's recent book The Commissar 
Vanishes documents the falsification of photographs and art in Stalin's Russia: 
Everything contrary to Stalin's cult was criminalized or expunged 
from history, especially all non-Stalinist and insufficiently 
Stalinist Communists who had previously led the revolutionary 
party and the new Soviet state. 3 
The commissars were simply made to vanish. 
Falsification could take place through addition or subtraction, but subtraction 
followed the logic of the purges and became the method of choice. The airbrushed 
erasures on the photographs corresponded to the more brutal erasures within the 
body politic. For example, Mr. King shows a photograph taken of Stalin and three 
comrades in 1926. King shows the same photograph reproduced in a history book 
from 1940, but cropped so that only two comrades remain. In a biography of Stalin 
from 1949, the same photograph is used, but showing only one comrade, the others 
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having been purged. In the most famous image derived from the original photograph, 
an oil painting made in 1929, Stalin stands alone. 4 Examples of this sort abound 
in King's book. 
Of course, Barker's Stalin is prescient; in the post-Stalinist era, Stalin's own 
image would be subject to erasure. In 1947, for example, the painter Vladimir 
Serov produced a large portrait titled "Lenin Proclaiming Soviet Power at the Second 
Congress of Soviets" for which he received a Stalin prize. In 1962, in the midst of 
de-Stalinization, and under pressure from Khrushchev, the painter entirely redid 
the work. In this second rendering, Stalin, who had been standing behind Lenin in 
the original, was painted out. 5 
There is another sort of phenomenon documented by King that is more 
disturbing, and stranger, than the falsifications produced by "official" erasure. 
"Soviet citizens," King reports, "fearful of the consequences of being caught in 
possession of material considered 'anti-Soviet' or 'counterrevolutionary', were 
forced to deface their own copies of books and photographs, often savagely attacking 
them with scissors or disfiguring them with India ink."6 
Defacement in the name of Stalinist orthodoxy was not so much the erasure 
or falsification of history as its truest indicator. The images of defacement are 
eerie. Reproduced here are some taken from the home of the artist Alexander 
Rodchencko. He had been asked to design a photographic album called "Ten 
Years of Uzbekistan" that would celebrate a decade of Soviet rule in that state. 
The Russian edition appeared in 1934, but three years later Stalin purged the 
Uzbekistan party leadership. At that point "Rodchenko was compelled to deface 
his own book." 7 Rodchenko obscured the images by blotting them out, blocking 
them out, and cutting them out by turns. But he only did with perhaps greater 
artistry what many Soviet citizens were doing. Also reproduced here is a detail 
from a photograph in the Soviet archives, defaced by persons unknown. 8 
Deconstructive Erasure 
Let me pause a moment on the word defacement. The OED lists more than 
six separate meanings, testifying to the word's density. But to begin with the literal 
and fundamental: defacement is about the face, the landscape or territory of the 
face, the presentation of the face to the world. Faces that are defaceable are generally 
public ones. In the context of Stalinism, defacement is an act of public signification. 
Of course, representation of the face must precede defacement (or effacement, as 
Stalin imagines it), and the action that brings Ilona, the Hungarian photographer 
and model, to Stalin in the final scene is Stalin's quest for yet another photographic 
portrait. "It is possible I do not actually know my face," he tells her, "and being 
presented with it, I may become enraged" (56). And then: "It is not a face I have 
here, it is a history" (57). So between Stalin's vision of erasure in the first scene to 
this face-off with Ilona in the last, Barker tangles us in images of the face which 
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have historical, theoretical, and psychosocial implications. 
One of the semantic shifts we can find in the word "deface" is a movement 
away from a literal marring or disfiguring of a face to a blotting out, or erasure, 
especially of writing or other marks, as the OED puts it. Accordingly, I want to 
shift here, to writing, and writing about writing. I am thinking of Derrida and his 
appropriation of erasure as a deconstructive device. 
In Of Grammatology Derrida argues that concepts from the history o f 
metaphysics should be put "under erasure" (sous rature). His well-known graphical 
indication of this erasure, which he borrows from Heidegger, is an X placed over 
the problematic word or concept, so that it is both visible and crossed out at once. 
Thus Derrida writes the phrase "the sign is that ill named thing," crossing out bo th 
the word "is" and the word "thing." 9 For Derrida, the mark of erasure indicates 
what is provisional and inadequate, but also what is necessary: provisional in v i ew 
of his critique of metaphysics and the always absent origin; necessary in that w e 
must use and work within the language and the philosophical tradition we have 
been given. Discussing Heidegger's use of the "mark of deletion," Derrida 
comments: 
That deletion is the final writing of an epoch. Under its strokes 
the presence of a transcendental signified is effaced while still 
remaining legible. [...] In as much as it de-limits onto-theology, 
the metaphysics of presence and logocentrism, this last writing 
is also the first writing. 1 0 
Thus "erasure" takes its place within that constellation of terms-trace, differance, 
supplement, and so on—that are the instruments of Derrida's deconstruction of 
metaphysics and the transcendental signified, the instruments that foreground 
"writing" as the contaminant of presence. 
We are dealing, then, in this linkage of Stalin and Derrida, with images of 
presence(s) and absence(s), indicated by certain graphical marks. Derrida puts 
key terms in the history of metaphysics under erasure—with an X, the mark o f a 
simultaneous legibility and effacement. Stalin, through the falsification of the 
photographic record, puts the history of the state under erasure. Soviet citizens, 
crudely duplicating the airbrushed erasures of official portraits, deface photographs 
with scribbles, scratch-marks, and Xs, obscuring the images without completely 
removing them, giving them a ghostly legibility. The presence of the face remains, 
but as a reminder of an absence, as a threatening vacancy. Totalitarian erasure and 
deconstructive erasure: a totalizing system set against a de-totalizing practice, a 
system that gathers all force to the center against a de-stabilizing practice at the 
margins. Juxtaposing them makes possible a reading of Barker through Derrida, 
and a reading of Derrida through Barker—with Stalinism as the c o m m o n 
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denominator. 
There are objections that might be raised against this approach at the outset. 
One is the charge that Derrida's work is inherently a-political and has little to say 
to the real-world event-ness of Stalinism. I will take up this objection later in the 
paper. A related objection may be even more fundamental: to the implication of a 
relationship between an anti-totalizing practice whose primary field is the text and 
a totalitarian practice whose primary field is the body. Here the tangled terrain of 
argument regarding Western philosophical totalities in relation to 20th century 
totalitarian practices comes into view. 
Albert Camus defined "totality" as "nothing other than the ancient dream of 
unity common to both believers and rebels, but projected horizontally onto an 
earth deprived of God." 1 1 Martin Jay, in his study of the discourse of totality, 
notes the long list of positives the Western tradition associates with this dream 
("coherence, order, fulfillment, harmony, plenitude, meaningfulness, consensus 
and community") as well as the negatives with which it is said to contrast 
("alienation, fragmentation, [and] disorder"). 1 2 It is this "ancient dream of unity" 
that Derrida locates within foundational texts and deconstructs. 
Stalin is the emblem of a totalizing political system, but we label it 
totalitarianism, denoting a form of power combining absolutist state bureaucracy 
with a cult of personality. Some view Stalinism as a possible endpoint, and perhaps 
the endpoint, of "totality" as a philosophical and social desideratum within the 
Western tradition. More specifically, the claim has been repeatedly made that 
Stalinism is the "logical" result of Marxism. 1 3 Camus himself famously connected 
Marxism and state terror. 1 4 Yet these linkages remain controversial. Fredric 
Jameson scorns what he calls the "shibboleths of a faddish post-Marxism" that 
have contributed to the "stigmatization of the concept of totality and of the project 
of totalizing thought." 1 5 He finds the notion of some "direct line [...] from Hegel's 
Absolute Spirit to Stalin's Gulag" akin to cold-war sloganeering. 1 6 Jay is more 
measured. He notes that the assorted failures of socialism in this century, including 
the revelation of Stalin's Gulag—and even more recent disasters—have made it 
difficult to think of totalitarian forms without considering the totalizing principles 
inherent in Marxist theory and its related philosophical traditions. 1 7 Similarly, 
Alvin Gouldner, while disputing the "mechanical" view of a straight-line logic 
from Marxism to Stalinism, suggests that Marxist theory, and the Bolshevik 
commitment to it, is unavoidably implicated in later developments: "We cannot 
act as if Stalinism was simply a myth invented to slander Marxism." 1 8 Later in the 
paper, we will return to the linkage of deconstruction, totality, and Stalinism from 
Derrida's point of view. For now let me observe that the relationship between 
"totality" and "totalitarianism" remains a matter of significant debate, particularly 
in the aftermath of deconstruction and the events of 1989. While these terms are 
not identical or causally-connected, except by a vulgar reduction, they are 
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nonetheless central to our understanding of 20th century history including our 
understanding of postmodernism. 
It is in the midst of all of this, as it were, that we find The Power of the Dog, 
written just after the dissemination of post-structuralist practices through Derrida 
and just before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of the East 
European states. Barker reinforces the connection between totali ty and 
totalitarianism and stages the scene of their mutual deconstruction. 
Barker and the Post-Structuralist Scene 
Barker imbricates totality and totalitarianism in part by infusing the script 
with Hegelian overtones. The play continuously implies the connection between 
Stalin and Hegel's great philosophical totality, thereby invoking the "direct line" 
that Jameson dismisses. Like many historical dramas of the past, The Power of the 
Dog examines the capacity of the individual to influence historical events. This is 
the territory of the Hegelian "world historical individual"—as Barker says, the 
"Great Man"—who embodies the transformative social forces of an age. Put in 
another light, the play investigates the Marxist contradiction of individual hegemony 
within, but also above, the totalitarian apparatus of the State. The play's dialectical 
subtitle, "Moments in History and Anti-History," fulfills itself in a scene structure 
that alternates between the Great Men of history—Stalin and Churchill in the first 
scene, Stalin alone thereafter—and the patients of history, in this case the soldiers 
and hangers-on along the Polish front. Barker travesties these Great Men, 
particularly in the first scene, but also gives them their due. For indeed, when 
were the powers of the individual leader/dictator more strongly applied, with more 
devastating results, than during World War II? One of the play's key images is that 
of a hanged woman, a death that stands in for the millions. Barker's method 
juxtaposes catastrophe and suffering on the front against Stalin's moody isolation 
in the Kremlin. In Scene Four, for example, he ponders his role in History and the 
prospect of his own death: 
Of course I will die eventually! [. . .] But when? There must 
come a proper moment, a moment when History will say, it was 
right that Stalin ceased to exercise the dictatorship of the 
proletariat then, but when? The problems seem to get worse, 
not better. Imagine if I died now, it would be a disaster! I have 
four hundred divisions on the Oder, this is a crucial moment in 
the history of the world! (28) 
The tone of Stalin's self-assertion here, depending as it does on our growing distance 
from these monolithic historical agents, is both comic and horrifying. It is a tone 
that characterizes the play's frequent invocations of History with a telos, in either 
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its Hegelian or Marxist incarnations. 
But if the play employs the Hegelian notion of the great man, the world-
historical individual, embodying History with a capital H, it also explores its 
dialectical opposite, what Barker calls Anti-history. Anti-history in this play is 
most closely associated with Ilona, the Hungarian photographer. It is her Antigone-
like quest to bury the body of her hanged sister and to deal with the ideological and 
romantic coercion of the Russian lieutenant Sorge that binds together the six scenes 
set in the Polish front. 
Ilona has been a fashion model and now roams Eastern Europe with her 
companion Victor in search of war atrocities to document. Their photographic 
style is unusual, in that Ilona poses next to many of the atrocities, often in fashionable 
attire. When Sorge takes an interest in the fact that the photographs may provide 
incriminating evidence of collaboration, he notes that many of the images "form a 
background for [her] face." "I like my face," she replies. Swayed by her, he 
admits: "You have a beautiful face. I merely wondered why you choose to decorate 
these pictures with it" (31). 
So Ilona's face becomes as much an issue in the play as Stalin's. She chooses 
to interpolate her own image into the record of atrocity. There is nothing in the 
play that accounts for this decision in any literal way What seems plausible is that 
she is engaged in a project of self-assertion, in which the lifeforce of her individual 
identity counters the absurdity and horror the war has engendered. Barker, in his 
collection of essays titled Arguments for a Theatre, refers explicitly to Hegelian 
categories by calling her collection of photographs the "willed creation of private 
history" and a form of "resistance to world-historical forces (an appalling category 
if ever there was one) [ . . . ] . " 1 9 
Ilona's method, in these terms, is not to deface in the sense of blotting out, but 
to outface—the first meaning of which is to overcome with a look or stare, the 
second meaning of which is to defy or resist. In a Derridean turn, the OED recognizes 
outface as a possible meaning of deface. Thus there is a sense of resisting, defying, 
even outshining, that is embedded in a term that normally suggests disfigurement, 
erasure, or extinction. The meaning of the term "deface" is deeply ambiguous or, 
as Derrida might have it, "undecidable." Ilona inhabits the territory of defacing as 
outfacing, as surely as Stalin inhabits the territory of defacing as erasure. This is 
one way of reading the subtitle: Moments in History and Anti-History. 
What Barker works toward structurally is the meeting between Stalin and 
Ilona in the final scene. Stalin has requested another portrait and another 
photographer, and through the indefatigable workings of the state, Ilona has been 
plucked off the battlefield to do the honors. Victor has by this time been shot and 
Sorge has been trundled off to the Gulag. Ilona meets Stalin alone. 
At first she succeeds in outfacing him. When Stalin tells her that even to 
photograph him is "fraught with risks," she responds: "Isn't it a face like any 
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other?" (56). When he states that other photographers have doctored his portraits 
by erasing his pock marks, she tells him that "every pock will be included" (56). 
Eventually Stalin undermines her composure and announces that the session is 
over. In a series of fraught moments in the final half page of dialogue, Ilona first 
asks Stalin to save Sorge from the Gulag. She struggles with herself, then retracts 
the request. Finally, she asks if she is to die. "Who said anything about dying?" 
Stalin responds (59). He extends his arms to her. Beleaguered, she falls into them. 
The play ends as Ilona repeatedly asks, "Are we safe?" as McGroot, the comedian, 
driven to the brink of madness, tries desperately to make a joke (59-60). 
One might say that drama's primal scene is the encounter of the self with the 
other, but The Power of the Dog stages this encounter in a way that evokes some of 
the issues of post-structuralism and postmodernism. The Hegelian encounter with 
the other is the Aufhebung that suggests annulment as well as a lifting-up. Hegel 
was concerned with "the union of union and nonunion and the identity of identity 
and difference"—that is to say, the absorption of difference into higher and higher 
forms of identity.2 0 In the final scene of the play, for the first time, Ilona and Stalin 
face off. The geography of the scene structure emphasizes Ilona's otherness: she is 
from the Polish front, from the margins; Stalin is at the Soviet center, Moscow. 
She is female, he is male. The history she represents is private and idiosyncratic; 
it combines a history of suffering along the front with her own willful refusal to 
become another victim. The History he represents is rhetorically and self-
consciously a totality in-the-making and retains a "world-historical" glow. Ilona is 
not an agent in these terms; hers is a history "from below," strategically directed at 
avoiding the mad dog of power as best she can. 
The ending of the play may be read as fundamentally pessimistic. An audience 
member may easily conclude that Ilona is steamrollered by Stalin's History, that is, 
by a totalizing history that is also totalitarian. In her face off with Stalin, her 
particular kind of strategic resistance, a defacement-as-outfacing, seems to succumb 
to defacement-as-erasure, the fate that both she and Sorge may reasonably expect 
to share. However, despite Stalin's threats and Ilona's tightrope maneuvering 
between courage and capitulation, nothing at the end of the play is finally decided. 
Barker maintains his ironic attitude toward the Hegelian elements he has evoked, 
and the lights go out on these figures strangely intertwined. To the extent that we 
can imagine these characters in "real" historical time, Ilona is vulnerable. But in 
Barker's theatre, the dominant impression is one of stalemate. There is no sense of 
Aufhebung. Because the differences between them are vividly presented and 
reinforced by the scene structure of the play, any union or resolution involving the 
two seems preposterous, dramatically unfeasible, obscene. Barker gives this face-
off a dialectical label, but he has little faith in dialectical progression—a not 
untypical stance for a British political dramatist in the 1980s. 
In Arguments for a Theatre Barker reiterates his distrust of moral consensus, 
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ideology, and metanarrative. Familiar elements of the post structuralist project, 
particularly its neo-Nietzschean tone, reverberate throughout the essays. "Every 
play is provisional, just as every statement must be provisional," he says. 2 1 The 
theatre must derive "its meaning precisely from the dissolution of coherent 
meaning." 2 2 The post-structuralist distrust of totality is displaced onto the 
consenting audience. Agreement, solidarity, unity of thought: in a "braver theatre" 
all this would be dismantled in favor of debate, ambiguity, and fragmentation. The 
actor becomes 
the figure who encourages the audience to abandon its moral 
and intellectual baggage and permit itself the greater freedom of 
an imaginative tour, essentially a de-stabilising experience. 
The proposition of a moral posture, and its immediate 
demolition [.. .] has the effect of loosening ideology, implying 
the absence of objective truths, and forcing the audience to 
make its own decisions about the actions shown or described. 2 3 
Barker is more than a disaffected socialist. In scorning monolithic ideologies and 
totalities of knowledge, in seeking to demolish common moral propositions, in 
asserting the provisionality of truths, in pursuing the de stabilizing and resistant 
moment, in creating histories rather than History, he demonstrates his affinities 
with post-structuralist interests and methodologies. These are the elements that 
inform his anti-Hegelianism and his approach to a scene in which, in the encounter 
of the "stable" historical self and its other, movement seems impossible. 
Derrida helps to contextualize such a moment with his continual reminder 
that the sigh is constituted by the repression of difference, of the completely other, 
which leaves behind only its trace. This is the "violent" hierarchy of the sign, 
which Derrida also finds in the oppositional structure of Western philosophy. 
Deconstruction aims to de-stabilize this hierarchy by locating those crucial 
"undecidable" moments of ambiguity, those aporias, that threaten to collapse the 
system of meaning a given text constructs. The pursuit of the other is crucial to 
this operation. If we read the play's final scene in grammatological or deconstructive 
terms, Stalinism serves as an emblem of presence, or the center. He represents a 
totalitarian regime that Barker links with both Hegelian and Marxist totalities: 
with History. Ilona functions as the de-stabilizing alterity that is always already 
present. She is summoned to Stalin in the first scene and arrives, always late, in 
the final one. Her alterity is dramatic, both in terms of Barker's structural strategy, 
and in terms the emphatic sense of difference she brings to the scene. She is the 
margin that has escaped the center until now. She is both the contaminant of the 
system and its necessary constituent. Bringing her together with Stalin capitalizes 
on the several meanings of defacement and de-stabilizes the center by revealing 
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the myth of self-presence. In grammatological terms, she is analogous to that 
"feared writing" within metaphysics-a "debased, lateralized, repressed, displaced 
theme [. . .] A feared writing must be cancelled because it erases the presence of 
the self same \propre] within speech." 2 4 In this sense she dictates Stalin's 
provisionality, putting him under erasure, just as Derrida puts all the terms of 
presence under erasure. 
We confront again a certain question of audacity. In "historical" time, Stalinism 
maintained itself through the political erasure of the purge. Barker's Stalin draws 
on this history-as-event, on the graves of the millions. In the play his power is 
veiled, yet implicit in every gesture, every glance. Hence he commands the most 
minute attention from every other character. In the final scene, Stalin never resorts 
to direct intimidation; yet the atmosphere of threat is so palpable, Ilona nearly 
faints. If we are to see this scene in terms of deconstructive erasure, of Barker's 
staging of an encounter that falls within the rubric of post-structuralism, we must 
rely on the terms set by Derrida's analysis of the sign. I have argued that we are 
encouraged in this reading both by what I would call Barker's post structuralist 
affinities and by the textual play in Barker's meditation on "defacement." But to 
what extent are these two practices, circulating around defacement and erasure, 
commensurate? To what extent are the political valences of "repression" compatible 
with the linguistic ones? To what extent is it permissible to bring deconstruction 
to bear on historical tragedy? 
Derrida and the Political 
The cross-hatchings and scribbles that deface the photographs of the 
commissars, even more than the airbrushed ellipses of the official portraits, are the 
signifiers of the Stalinist Terror in all its irreducible materiality. The Xs of Derridean 
erasure, at least within their original context, specify a linguistic operation that 
preserves the terminology of metaphysics in a tactical sense, while undermining 
its arche-teleological claims. The passage from the linguistic operation (however 
great its philosophical import) to the historicity of the Terror may seem vexed, 
itself a kind of aporia. Critics of Derrida have tended to view him in precisely this 
light—as having little to say to either politics or history and as moving solely 
within the infinite play of language. From this perspective he is unable to offer 
more than relativism with respect to the interpretation of texts and withdrawl, as a 
species of nihilism, with respect to the politico-historical realm. 
Consider again Derrida's use of the word "violence." The term recurs 
throughout Derrida's work. In Of Grammatology, Derrida considers the "originary 
violence" associated with writing, called forth by the "desire for a speech displacing 
its other and its double and working to reduce its difference." Writing "threatened 
the desire for the living speech from the closest proximity, it breached living speech 
from within and from the very beginning" 2 5 [emphasis mine]. In a later passage 
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he considers the relationship of this originary violence to our "common concept" 
of violence: 
Out of this arche-violence, forbidden and therefore confirmed 
by a second violence that is reparatory, protective, instituting 
the "moral," prescribing the concealment of writing and the 
effacement and obliteration of the so called proper name which 
was already dividing the proper, a third violence can possibly 
emerge or not (an empirical possibility) within what is commonly 
called evil, war, indiscretion, rape [ . . . ] . It is on this tertiary 
level, that of empirical consciousness, that the common concept 
of violence (the system of moral law and of transgression) whose 
possibility remains yet unthought, should no doubt be situated. 2 6 
This hierarchy would seem to lead from language to event. Nonetheless, 
within this particular text, the connection from the originary violence to the 
"common concept of violence," the third violence, remains of peripheral interest. 
As an example: in the first essay of Part II, "The Violence of the Letter," Derrida 
takes up Levi-Strauss's linkage of writing/literacy with power/enslavement. Without 
utterly denying this linkage, Derrida deconstructs this view of "violence" by 
revealing its dependence upon the myth of presence ascribed to speech, in which 
the "originary violence" of writing-as-difference is always already situated.2 7 His 
consideration of the tertiary, as filtered through the texts of Levi-Strauss, simply 
returns the discussion to its primary theme: the constitutive and originary repressions 
of language. 
In his essay on Emmanuel Levinas in Writing and Difference, "Violence and 
Metaphysics," Derrida describes Levinas' conviction that "the entire philosophical 
tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, would make common cause with oppression 
and with the totalitarianism of the same." 2 8 The language here is essentially political 
in ways that would seem to make synaptic contact with the "third violence," but 
again there is considerable restraint. Derrida uses Levinas as another text (although 
a privileged one, given Derrida's well-known affinities with Levinas' thought) 
through which he explores an economy of violence functioning within the resources 
of language and metaphysics. Let me cite one more passage from his early work. 
In Positions, a set of interviews from 1972, he discusses the deconstruction of 
classical binaries in these terms: 
In a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with 
the peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis, but rather with a violent 
hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other [. . . ] or has 
the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to 
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overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook this phase 
of overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating 
structure of opposition. 2 9 
Again his language strikingly employs a political vocabulary: "peaceful 
coexistence," "violent hierarchy," "governs," "overturn," "subordinating structure." 
One feels that Derrida could simply race through his own hierarchy at will, from 
"originary" to "second" and "third violence," energizing this political vocabulary 
and enabling a politics of deconstruction in the process. Yet at this stage in his 
work, such connections remain latent and under constraint. For many readers, the 
politics of deconstruction, as emerging (or not) from Derrida's work from the 1960s 
to, let's say, the early 1990s, were problematic if not entirely far-fetched. "Violence" 
remained enclosed within the mechanisms of the sign and therefore within a 
circulation of texts. In 1972, in The Prison-House of Language (the Nietzschean 
phrase resonates for many of Derrida's detractors), Fredric Jameson, although not 
dismissive of Derrida, described his project as feeling its way "gropingly along the 
walls of its own conceptual prison. " 3 0 In 1978, Hay den White memorably summed 
up Derrida as a "minotaur imprisoned in structuralism's hypostatized labyrinth of 
language." 3 1 In the same year Edward Said accused him of reducing "everything 
we think as having some extratextual leverage in the text to a textual function." 3 2 
More such examples could be easily adduced. 
Derrida frequently defended himself against the charges of linguistic self-
imprisonment. And others, like Christopher Norris, have sought to frame his work 
in terms of positive contributions within the tradition of rational critique. 3 3 The 
debate continues. But from the late 1980s onward, it became somewhat more 
difficult to maintain the "prison-house of language" position, if only because 
Derrida's writing took such a marked swing toward the political—if I may abbreviate 
the complexity of the discussion. In a series of works "beginning," for the sake of 
convenience, in 1989 with a lecture titled "Force of Law: 'The Mystical Foundation 
of Authority,'" Derrida took up a cluster of terms— law, justice, democracy—that 
he had not previously foregrounded. 3 4 In short, he began to theorize justice. In his 
lecture he acknowledged the reticence apparent within his own record: 
"Deconstruction, while seeming not to 'address' the problem of justice, has done 
nothing but address it, if only obliquely, unable to do so directly."3 5 The notion 
that deconstruction has "done nothing but address it" has become something closer 
to a literal truth in the 1990s. It is well beyond the scope of this essay to address 
the intricacy of Derrida's thought as it has developed in recent works such as "The 
Force of Law," The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe (1992), Specters 
of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International 
(1994), "Foi et Savoir: Les Deux sources de la 'religion' aux limites de la simple 
raison" (1996), and Politics of Friendship (1997). However, a few brief remarks 
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about the themes of this "turn" to justice are in order. 
In "Force of Law," violence is redeployed as the originary moment of authority 
and law. But in this context the term more easily elides with the "common concept 
of violence," or at least a recognizable politics, as in this sentence: "As you know, 
in many countries, in the past and in the present, one founding violence of the law 
or of the imposition of state law has consisted in imposing a language on national 
or ethnic minorities regrouped by the state." This sort of connection to the 
materiality of world politics becomes a feature of his work. In Specters of Marx, 
there is a remarkable passage, distinctive for its lack of reticence: 
No justice—let us not say no law and once again we are not 
speaking here of laws :—seems possible or thinkable without the 
principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within 
that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those 
who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of 
wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, 
colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of 
oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of 
totalitarianism. 3 7 
Later in the book, Derrida goes on to list the ten "plagues of the 'new world order'," 
all topical, ethico-political concerns: unemployment, homelessness, the spread of 
nuclear weapons, and so on. All of this suggests that what might be viewed as a 
latent political vocabulary in Derrida's earlier work is no longer latent, and that the 
second and third tiers of the hierarchy of violence referred to in Of Grammatology, 
have taken a more central position in his thinking. 
Derrida's turn to justice does not result in anything programmatic, however. 
Justice is linked to the experience of the impossible, and it "remains, is yet, to 
come, a venir [. . .] the very dimension of events irreducibly to come." 3 9 For that 
reason, "one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, 
say 'this is just' and even less 'I am just', without immediately betraying justice." 4 0 
The tension between Derrida's willingness to offer a descriptive view of injustice 
in the "new world order," in contradistinction to his theorizing of justice (and 
democracy) as that which is to-come, and that which cannot be spoken of except 
obliquely, has prompted considerable debate. Moishe Postone, for example, 
questions the adequacy of Derrida's social critique in relation to his deconstructive 
premises, 4 1 while Fredric Jameson views Derrida's return to Marx in generally 
favorable terms. 4 2 He does question Derrida's evasiveness with respect to 
materialism; nonetheless he is inclined to see "spectrality" in material terms and to 
view it as a (possibly) trenchant criticism of late capitalism. 4 3 Mark Lilla, in a 
review of six of Derrida's most recent works, rehearses the old argument that an 
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impassable divide between language and reality imposes itself in Derrida's work, 
adding that his notion of politics is so evanescent and non-programmatic as to be 
indistinguishable from a dream. 4 4 
In any case, Derrida's work in the 1990s, to the extent that it is affirmative (if 
not programmatic), to the extent that it responds to, in Derrida's words, "an ethical 
and political imperative" rather than a "taste for the void," 4 5 has altered the dialogue 
on deconstruction. Richard Beardsworth's book-length study of Derrida's 
refashioning of the "political," asserts that Derrida has recast the terms in which 
"all institutional violence" is to be thought. 4 6 As it has adjusted its orientation 
from a more restricted concern with Western metaphysics to a more open 
engagement with the problem of justice, deconstruction has opened a space for an 
analysis of Stalinism and totalitarianism. The question of propriety in setting 
deconstructive erasure against Stalinist erasure becomes less of an issue as the 
putative distance between the two practices diminishes. 
This distance narrows further still when we consider the evidence for a direct 
connection between Stalinism and deconstruction that Derrida increasingly 
acknowledges. In Specters ofMarx, Derrida revisits the atmosphere of the 1950s, 
characterized, as he says, by the "apocalyptic tone of philosophy" in which "the 
eschatological themes of the 'end of history', of the 'end of Marxism', of the 'end of 
philosophy', of the 'ends of man', or the 'last man' and so forth were [...] our daily 
bread." 4 7 He identifies this period, then, with the intensive reading and analysis of 
"the classics of the end." In addition, the period was about 
on the other hand and indissociably, what we had known or what 
some of us for quite some time no longer hid from concerning 
totalitarian terror in all the Eastern countries, all the socio-
economic disasters of Soviet bureaucracy, the Stalinism of the 
past and the neo-Stalinism in process. . . . Such was no doubt 
the element in which what is called deconstruction developed— 
and one can understand nothing of this period of deconstruction 
[...] unless one takes this historical entanglement into account. 4 8 
Here Derrida shifts our perspective away from deconstruction's engagement with 
foundational texts. Commensurate with his recent effort to deconstruct our political 
traditions (not in order to "depoliticize," as he says, "but in order to interpret 
differently the concept of the political" ) , 4 9 he offers, albeit in abbreviated form, an 
account of the political conditions out of which deconstruction arose. And these 
conditions have much to do with Stalinism. Of course, revelations about Stalinism 
were ongoing. Martin Jay discusses the impact during the 1970s of Solzhenitsyn's 
The Gulag Archipelago.50 Once the implications of the Gulag could no longer be 
evaded, he suggests, totalizing accounts of history, including the most sophisticated 
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forms of Marxism, lost favor. Thus over a period of years, new perspectives on 
Stalinism and the Terror came to light and shaped the political ecology that provided 
for deconstruction's birth and development. 
In Derrida's essay "Back from Moscow, in the USSR," inspired by his own 
trip to Moscow in 1990, he considers travel narratives depicting visits to the Soviet 
Union, including Walter Benjamin's Moscow Diary and Andre Gide's Back from 
the USSR. Noting the mythic resonance of the Soviet revolution for the Left, 
Derrida interprets the subtext of such journeys as nothing less than a quest for the 
Grail, rendered as "the quest for the universal, for universally human meaning" 
and "absolute human culture." 5 1 In speaking of Benjamin's Moscow Diary and his 
distinction between the language of "expression" (denoting presence and 
authenticity) and "communication" (denoting the semiotic and therefore a 
"dethronement" of authentic language), Derrida argues: 
But of course, the ideal language he dreams of for his text on 
Moscow, the one he has no choice but to renounce, is a purely 
expressive language that would let the thing itself speak, the 
thing then known and manifested in its name [. . . ] as if, in this 
very singular moment of history, in this 'present moment', what 
is happening in Moscow could restore a supralapsarian 
experience of language, a sort of redemption from sin. 5 2 
The longing Derrida finds in this narrative (and others in the same genre) is therefore 
a familiar one: the desire for the universal, for presence, logos, and authenticity. It 
is the desire for transparent "speech." Of course, these narratives also articulate 
deep disillusionment as the promise of the revolution goes unfulfilled. This 
disillusionment again ties Stalinism to a range of intellectual projects initiated in 
his wake. For Derrida, the notion of "coming back from Moscow" is not just a fact 
of geography, but an act of deconstruction. To come back from Moscow is to let 
go of the desire for pure presence. Moreover, this "coming back from" proves to 
be not only or simply a project for Western intellectuals who had observed Stalinism 
first hand or who had been influenced by the promises of the Soviet state. It 
becomes a material fact experienced by the Soviet Union itself—throughperestroika 
and then through actual political dissolution. Derrida notes, in his typically 
circumspect way, that perestroika, usually translated as 'construction' or 
'reconstruction', has had another meaning: 
I would not myself have dared to say 'deconstructed' if certain of 
my interlocutors of the Institute of Philosophy of Moscow's 
Academy of Sciences had not told me in all seriousness that in 
their eyes the best translation, the translation that they were using 
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among themselves forperestroika, was "deconstruction." [. . . ] 
a Soviet col league said to me, scarcely laughing, "But 
deconstruction, that's the USSR today." 5 3 
Deconstruction is thereby linked to post-Stalinism by those responsible for 
rebuilding Russian society. 
To summarize: as the font of revolution, the Soviet Union became a locus 
for a dream of plenitude and presence. But from the 1930s onward, when the 
dream began to dissolve, the task was to awaken: to return from the dream and to 
destroy, destructure, and deconstruct what it had produced. For those engaged in 
perestroika and its aftermath, that task, that deconstruction, was material and 
political. For Derrida, coming of age in the shadow of Stalinism, struck as a young 
man by its failures (after reading Gide), that task became, in the first place, 
profoundly philosophical. But in either case, the totalitarian logic of Stalinism 
and the experience of the Soviet Union was deeply implicated in the project of 
deconstruction and in the undoing of Western totalities that has been the main 
feature of Derrida's work. The return from Stalinism as a form of social 
deconstruction has been partner to the return from presence as philosophical 
deconstruction. 
These linkages, always latent in his work, have come to the foreground only 
in Derrida's more recent writing. In Barker's The Power of the Dog, these linkages 
are brought together in a particularly potent form that anticipates the dialogue 
about politics and post-structuralism, totalitarianism and totalities, that would begin 
in earnest and in an affirmative key, in Derrida and elsewhere, ten years or more 
later. What Barker shows us, in part, is the necessity of bringing Stalin on-stage 
during the post-structuralist moment. In the face-off with Ilona, in his confrontation 
with the other he cannot escape or subsume, we see how totalitarian erasure returns 
as deconstructive erasure, insuring not only the impermanence of Stalin's face, but 
of the ground upon which he stands: destabilized and made endlessly provisional, 
defaced by that crossing-out (or rubbing out) that so haunts him. As Derrida would 
later say of Marx, what counts is not ontology, but "hauntology." Stalin's fears are 
finally not a matter of mere poetic justice, if what we mean is that his attempt to 
glorify his own image in history (while effacing the images of his enemies) must 
eventually become the vehicle of his own expurgation. Something more profound 
is at work—not simply a demotion within the Soviet pantheon enacted by 
Khrushchev and his successors, not just political and historical revaluation, but 
that fundamental reviewing of the Western tradition that erases the very terms by 
which "History" and "Stalinism" were conceived and implemented. Stalin's fear 
of defacement in the play ultimately describes a very wide arc of thought, one that 
derives from Barker's intense engagement with his cultural moment and with the 
issues that post structuralism has precipitated and continues to debate. 
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The Question of the Postmodern 
Mark C. Taylor identifies Derrida's postmodernity with his production of 
uncertainty through the solicitation of the other: 
By attempting to de-construct both the constructive subject and 
the horrifying world it has created Derrida points beyond the 
cer ta in ty of abso lu te knowledge to the uncer ta in ty of 
postmodernity. Always arriving late, forever, coming second, 
and never re turning on t ime, deconstruction repeatedly 
demonstrates the impossibility of modernity by soliciting the 
other which, though never present, "always already," haunts 
presence . As the end of modernity, deconstruct ion is 
postmodern. 5 4 
The "horrifying world" created out of the "constructive subject" of modernity 
is very much Barker's territory. He calls it "Catastrophe." Barker's response to 
this world is to create characters who resist absolute knowledge (for Barker, 
ideology) by all means available. "The unpredictability of the human soul," he 
says in his essays, "resistant to ideology and the tortures of logic, [becomes] a 
source of hope." 5 5 Certainly Ilona illustrates this unpredictability; she survives in 
part because she is unafraid of contradiction, becoming by turns compliant and 
steely, indulgent and with holding, passionate and skeptical, courageous and 
cowardly It is not ill advised to invoke Shakespeare in describing her rich ambiguity 
as a dramatic character and her resistance to easy continuities. Indeed, Barker's 
commitment to characterization—to the individual subject preserving itself within 
and against the blandishments of ideologues and Great Men—distinguishes his 
post-modernism from the sort Elinor Fuchs identifies with the "death of character."56 
Even Stalin in The Power of the Dog emerges as a compellingly human, 
individualized figure. When Barker stages the confrontation between Stalin and 
Ilona, between what I have called a totalizing presence and its other, it is the radical 
difference between the two that resonates and prevents closure. Barker has in 
effect "solicited the other" precisely to introduce this de-stabilizing difference. It 
should be noted that this difference is not merely an abstraction or strategy of 
reading; it is felt, in performance, through the actors' engagement with Barker's 
splendid characterizations. 
Barker's postmodernism, then, aligns itself with Derrida's. But there is another 
point to make: through their solicitation of the other, both Derrida and Barker 
move—with great circumspection and tentativeness, and without anything 
resembling a program—toward an affirmative stance. Derrida, as we have seen, 
has been accused of relativism and nihilism; Barker of pessimism. Nonetheless, 
Barker suggests in one of his essays that the reward for the "complexity and pain" 
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the audience must experience in the theatre of "Catastrophe" is an "imaginative 
ambition" in which lies "the possibility, of reconstruction." 5 7 We might approach 
such a possibility in The Power of the Dog from the perspective of Derrida's 
theorizing of justice. 
It is generally agreed that Derrida has moved closer to Levinas' position 
(already influential in Derrida's work) that the ethical relation to the other subverts 
the ontology of presence and creates the possibility of justice. In an interview 
from 1994, Derrida approvingly cites Levinas' definition of justice: "justice is the 
relation to the other." 5 8 In moving toward this position Derrida has activated the 
ethical relation to the other as a key component of his work. "Deconstruction," as 
he says, "is not an enclosure in nothingness, but an openness to the other." 5 9 It is in 
these notions of responsibility and respect to the alterity of the other that Derrida 
moves toward justice, even if framed as a justice to-come, an opening to a future 
that cannot be anticipated. The summoning of Ilona as an irreducible alterity before 
Stalin, echoes these themes. Ilona is the unheard voice that must somehow be 
heard; she is, in Derrida's terms, the "singularity," that must be taken into account. 
In this sense, Barker's final scene bridges two worlds. It looks backward at the 
modern tragedy of Stalinism and the shadow of the purges, but forward toward a 
postmodern reckoning. The demands of Ilona's otherness create a moment in which 
a postmodern politics might be seen to take shape, a moment when the "possibility 
of reconstruction" begins to emerge. 
Read from the affirmative stance suggested by Derrida's exploration of justice, 
then, the play's final moments may be seen to transcend the sense of exhaustion 
and stalement that envelops the characters. The face off between the oppressor 
and his victim elides into a face-to-face relationship with the other that contains 
within it, as a seed, the potential of justice. We may then remind ourselves that 
faces need not be condemned to erasure and defacement, and need not function 
solely as emblems of oppression or as signs of the West's catastrophe(s). They 
may also be the vehicle of an "ethical rapport" (as Levinas says) that encourages 
us to think the future. 6 0 
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